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Non-technical Summary
In the present study, we contribute to the understanding of the principal objectives of 
small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) and of the various dimensions of constraints affecting
their behavior. Our work has been motivated by the premise that in order to formulate a coherent
strategy vis a vis entrepreneurs and the SME sector, it is necessary to (a) understand the
objectives of these firms, (b) comprehend how different constraints affect SME formation and
performance, and (c) be able to rank the relative severity of these constraints. In order to achieve
this goal, we have designed a flexible survey instrument and administered it to owners and top
managers of SMEs in Russia and Bulgaria. The survey allows us to (a) identify the principal
objectives of SMEs, (b) rate and rank the severity of different types of constraints faced by the
SMEs without needing to resort to subjective interpretations and (b) employ the instrument in a
comparative setting across different economies. We carry out an econometric analysis of the
information obtained from the questionnaire and draw conclusions about the behavior of SMEs
in transition economies.
Our study of stratified random samples of 216 Russian and 221 Bulgarian SMEs shows a
remarkable similarity of views of their owners/top managers (CEOs) with respect to objectives
and constraints that they face. This finding suggests that the nature of issues confronting SMEs
and the policies that may be formulated to assist them are similar across the transition economies.
The CEO responses and data from their firms yield the following specific conclusions:
1.  The SMEs in the two economies are primarily recently created and privately owned firms that
are characterized by highly concentrated ownership. The two most important objectives of
their CEOs are achieving the highest possible profit and output growth. While for new and
small firms these two objectives may represent the same goal, the emphasis on output growth
may also signal the presence of obstacles to growth. In the future, researchers ought to
examine in depth these two competing explanations. Resolving this issue is important from
both the academic and policy standpoint.
2.  Most CEOs in both countries perceive to be hampered by a relatively small number of
specific constraints. The five constraints that they cite most frequently as being most
important in both countries are: (i) "suppliers are often not ready to deliver", (ii) the firm is
facing "financing problems that hinder expanding production", (iii) the firm is facing high
"level of interest rates", (iv) the firm is facing constraints on "getting land, office space and
buildings", and (v) "other production constraints".
3.  Constraints on obtaining external financing and the high cost of this financing are hence two
of the top five constraints cited by most CEOs. The lack of credit finance was also cited by
the CEOs as being the most important obstacle to increasing local sales, and it also appeared
as the most important constraint with respect to increasing exports. Moreover, the constraint
appears to be binding across the board, since the probability of it being selected as the most
important constraint to expanding production is unrelated to manager-, firm- or sector-
specific variables. Finally, only about a third of the surveyed firms report receiving a loan
from a financial institution over the pas three years and an even smaller fraction have heard
about special financing programs for SMEs. Our principal finding is hence that the external
financing constraint is a serious one. We also find that firms reinvest profits while operating3
under the external financing constraint. We hence conclude that financial constraints hamper
SME growth and that the use of internal finance by SMEs represents a fall-back option. In
this sense our study provides evidence that is contrary to the findings of Johnson, McMillan
and Woodruff (1999). Our evidence is consistent, however, with the findings of Rajan and
Zingales (1998), Winker (1999) and Lizal and Svejnar (2000).
4.  Our econometric analysis of the determinants of the most important constraints indicate that
all three sets of factors (characteristics of the entrepreneur, of the firm and of the firm’s
environment) are important. However, their effect is not always uniform across countries and
constraints. For example, more educated entrepreneurs are better able to ensure that suppliers
deliver and in Bulgaria they are also better able to get around the problem of high interest
rates. Firm-specific factors are found to be important in that larger size firms for instance
suffer more from unreliable supplier deliveries, capital intensive firms complain more about
the problem of high interest rates and more established (older) and larger firms are better able
to cope with problems of getting land, office space and buildings. Environmental factors,
which we capture by the sectoral location of the firm, are important but their effect often
differs in the two economies. In Bulgaria, firms in manufacturing suffer more than other
firms from supplier delivery problems, while the situation is reverse in Russia. Yet, in Russia
manufacturing firms suffer more than others from the problem of getting land, office space
and buildings, while the situation is just the opposite in Bulgaria. Finally, we find that the
most important constraints in the areas of production and finance are all-encompassing in
Russia in that they affect SMEs irrespective of the characteristics of the CEO, the firm, or the
sector of activity. In contrast, in Bulgaria the severity of the most important constraints in
these two areas varies systematically with the CEO, firm and sectoral characteristics. These
differences suggest that the nature of disruption of production and of the financial constraints
after the fall of central planning was more ubiquitous and all-encompassing in Russia than in
Bulgaria. Hence, our empirical evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the
disorganization phenomenon modelled for instance by Blanchard and Kremer (1997) and
Roland and Verdier (1999) was more prevalent in the former Soviet Union than in the
satellite countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
5.  Finally, while SMEs would clearly benefit in their development if they had fair access to
doing business with the state sector, our findings indicate that the state firms and other
government institutions discriminate or project the image that they discriminate against
SMEs in allocating contracts. Moreover, the state’s delinquency in making payments for
goods delivered and services rendered makes it difficult for the financially strapped SMEs to
do business with the state sector.4
Objectives and Constraints of Entrepreneurs:
Evidence from Small and Medium Size Enterprises in Russia and Bulgaria
1. Introduction
Entrepreneurs, start-up companies and small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) played
a very limited part under central planning. Their relative absence reflected planners’ difficulties
in controlling a large number of small and independent agents, as well as their belief in the
existence of economies of scale.
1 As the central controls were lifted, new entrepreneurs rapidly
emerged and in a number of countries they became a principal driving force of economic
development. In the Czech Republic, for example, manufacturing firms with fewer than 25
employees constituted 0.8% of all firms and accounted for 0.0% of total manufacturing output in
1989. By 1993, these firms constituted 89.9% of all manufacturing firms and produced 10.6% of
manufacturing output (Zemplinerova and Stibal, 1995). Many of these small firms also grew
rapidly in size. By 1994, many of them moved into the next size category of firms with 25-200
employees, accounting for the growth in its share of output from 0.1% in 1989 to 11.3% in 1993
and 14.2% in 1994.  Similarly, (EBRD, 1993) estimated that over 1.5 million small businesses
were in existence in Poland by the end of 1992 and Gomulka (1994) reported that the growth of
output in Poland between 1992 and 1994 was accounted for primarily by the booming SME
sector.
While SMEs thus constitute very dynamic firms, their behavior is not yet well understood
and limited evidence suggests that they often face economic, institutional and legal obstacles,
                    
1 EBRD (1995) for instance reports that while SMEs accounted for over two-thirds of the labor force in
Czechoslovakia and Hungary in the early 1930s, by 1989 this share fell to less than one-third. Moreover,5
including limited access to working capital and long term credit, legal and regulatory restrictions,
inadequate infrastructure, and limited managerial and technical expertise. The issue has received
some attention from theorists but empirical evidence has been sketchy.
In the present study, we contribute to the understanding of the principal objectives of
SMEs and of the various dimensions of constraints affecting their behavior. Our work has been
motivated by the premise that in order to formulate a coherent strategy vis a vis entrepreneurs and
the SME sector, it is necessary to (a) understand the objectives of these firms, (b) comprehend
how different constraints affect SME formation and performance, and (c) be able to rank the
relative severity of these constraints. In order to achieve this goal, we have designed a flexible
survey instrument and administered it to owners and top managers of SMEs in Russia and
Bulgaria. The survey allows us to (a) identify the principal objectives of SMEs, (b) rate and rank
the severity of different types of constraints faced by the SMEs without needing to resort to
subjective interpretations and (b) employ the instrument in a comparative setting across different
economies. We carry out an econometric analysis of the information obtained from the
questionnaire and draw conclusions about the behavior of SMEs in transition economies.
2.  Methodology
2.1 Theoretical Underpinnings
There have been several strands of the theoretical literature dealing with the factors that affect
the emergence and performance of firms. Broadly speaking, the factors can be divided into those
dealing with the entrepreneur, the structure of the firm, and the environment in which the
                                                                              
while the average size of an enterprise in these two economies grew to 2000 workers by 1989, the
corresponding figure in the European Union was seven workers.6
entrepreneurs and firms operate. The issue of what personal or group characteristics make good
entrepreneurs is an old one. Among individual characteristics, education has for instance been
given emphasis in the human capital literature, while factors such as ethnicity and social
background have featured in the anthropological and sociological studies. Group characteristics
of entrepreneurs have been analyzed in the literatures dealing with owner-managed firms,
separation of ownership and control, labor-managed or worker-owned firms, state-owned
enterprises, and nonprofit organizations (see e.g., Williamson, 1985, Hart and Moore, 1990, and
Bonin, Jones and Putterman, 1993). The structure or internal organization of firms has been
studied primarily from the standpoints of bounded rationality, agency problems and strategic
behavior (see e.g., Hurwizc, 1973, Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, and Ben-Ner, Montias and
Neuberger, 1993). Finally, the environmental factors usually refer to the existence and
functioning of the financial and other markets, the extent of development of infrastructure, and
the presence of a legal framework, regulation and institutions of enforcement. In the transition
context, considerable emphasis has also been placed on the achievement of macroeconomic
stability (see e.g., Fischer, Sahay and Vegh, 1996).
In the context of the environment faced by entrepreneurs and firms, a question has arisen
about the effects on firms of financial constraints brought about by the underdevelopment of
financial markets in the transition and other developing economies. A large theoretical literature,
reviewed by Levine (1997), points to the importance of financial sector development for
economic growth through better identification of investment projects, better availability and
lower cost of external financing to firms, improved risk taking, technological innovation, and7
other factors. In this context, Rajan and Zingales (1998) present industry-level evidence from a
large sample of countries showing that firms needing external finance tend to develop slower in
countries with less developed financial markets. Similarly, in their analysis of the population of
Czech industrial firms with 25 or more workers, Lizal and Svejnar (2000) find that smaller firms
(especially limited liability companies and cooperatives) have lower rates of investment and
show signs of capital rationing in that their investment depends on the availability of internal
funds. In contrast, Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (1999) find in a survey of private
manufacturing firms in Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, and Russia that the absence of
external financing does not prevent firms from investing. They conclude that the financial
constraint is not restrictive in that internal finance can substitute for external finance.
In this paper, we examine the absolute and relative importance of a wide range of potential
constraints facing small and medium size firms in Bulgaria and Russia. Our results indicate that
several constraints are almost uniformly viewed as greatly restricting SME operations, with the
lack or high cost of external financing being ranked on the top of the list. We also find that firms
reinvest profits while operating under the external financing constraint. We hence conclude that
financial constraints hamper SME growth and development and that the use of internal finance
by SMEs represents a fall-back option.
2.2 The Survey
During the summer of 1995 we administered an extensive questionnaire to the owners
and/or chief executive officers (hereafter CEOs) in a sample of 216 firms in the Krasnodar region
of Russia (hereafter Russia) and 221 firms in Bulgaria. The goal of the interviews was to obtain8
information about the objectives of the firms and about the absolute and relative importance of
the principal constraints faced by the firms. In order to assess the factors that lead managers to
select particular constraints as being the most severe, we also collected information on the
characteristics of the CEO, the firm, and the sector of the firm’s operation.
In the main body of our questionnaire we focused on identifying the absolute and relative
severity of the constraints faced by the SMEs in the areas of 1) production, 2) technology, 3)
procurement of non-labor inputs, 4) sales, 5) finance, 6) infrastructure, 7) regulation and taxation,
8) labor, and 9) business services. Within each of these nine areas, each CEO was asked to rate
on a scale from 1 (unimportant) to 5 (very important) the severity of several specific constraints.
Each CEO was then provided with a complete list of the specific constraints that he had rated as
very important (5) and, for questions in which he had rated no constraint as very important, he
was also presented with constraints that he had rated as important (number 4 on the scale). The
CEOs were then asked to examine this list of highly rated constraints from all the areas and to
identify and rank the ten most important ones. In this way we have obtained (a) the absolute
rating of the various specific constraints and information on the most important constraint
(partial ranking) within each area, and (b) the relative ranking for the top ten highly rated specific
constraints, irrespective of area.
In addition to tabulating the responses, we have used multinomial logit regressions to
evaluate the extent to which CEO-specific, firm-specific and sectoral variables explain which
constraints the CEOs identify as being the most important ones.9
2.3 The Samples
The samples constitute regionally stratified random samples based on the best data that
we could obtain on the population of SMEs in Bulgaria and Russia.
2  As has been done in other
enterprise-level surveys, the lack of historical data has forced us to sample existing firms and to
collect current and retrospective information about them. This approach has the advantage of
being feasible and affordable.  Its drawback is that it produces duration bias.  The bias stems
from the fact that some firms did not perform well and closed down before the date of our
sampling, while others were very successful and outgrew the category of small and medium sized
firms.  The usual sampling procedure thus excludes (truncates) the worst and best performing
enterprises and oversamples firms that survive in a given category for relatively long periods of
time. In order to minimize the duration bias, we set a relatively high upper limit on the number of
workers (200 vs.the usual 100) in the selection of SMEs.
3 The summary statistics related to the
samples firms are reported in the Appendix. As may be seen from the Appendix, the SMEs in the
two economies are primarily recently created and privately owned firms that are characterized by
highly concentrated ownership.
After providing information about the objectives of their firms, the CEOs were asked a
battery of questions about the obstacles and constraints they faced. As mentioned earlier, we
formulated the questions in such a way as to obtain the best possible absolute and relative
valuation of the severity of various constraints.
                    
2 In Russia the firms are located within the Krasnodar region, while in Bulgaria the firms are mostly
located in the greater Sofia region.
3 We have also made considerable effort to trace some of the extinct firms but this effort eventually
proved unsuccessful.10
3. Objectives of the Firms
The CEOs were presented with a list of possible objectives and they were asked to rate
each objective as well as to identify the "most important" one.
4 The results of this exercise are
presented in Table 1.  In each country there is virtually no difference between the objectives
identified as important by the entire sample of firms and the sub-sample composed of private
firms only. However, while both the Russian and Bulgarian SMEs tend to identify output and
profit as "very important" as well as the "most important" objectives, in Russia the SMEs place
somewhat more emphasis on profit, while in Bulgaria they place more emphasis on output.
Indeed, while the same percentage (71%) of Russian firms rate profit and output as "very
important", 72% of Bulgarian firms rate output but only 44% rate profit as "very important".
Moreover, while 49% of the Russian firms identify profit and 38% output as the "most
important" objective, the respective percentages in the Bulgarian sample are 26% and 52%. Our
retrospective questions indicate that the objectives appear to be stable over time and unrelated to
company ownership.
Overall, the SMEs hence place emphasis on both profit and output maximization. For
small firms, the two goals may of course be mutually consistent as growth may lead to increased
profitability and improved likelihood of survival.
5 Nevertheless, in future research it will be
desirable to examine more systematically the almost universally accepted assumption that the
newly created firms in the transition economies behave as profit maximizers.
                    
4 The list consisted of the following objectives: achieve highest possible profit, output, employment,
wages, and non-wage benefits, prepare for privatisation (if state owned), prevent of social conflict, and
other.11
4. Obstacles and Constraints Faced by the Entrepreneurs
4.1 The Analytical Approach
In evaluating CEOs’ responses about constraints, we use both cross tabulations and
multinomial logit regressions.
6 In the logits, we focus on explaining the determinants of the
probability that the SME cites a given constraint as being the most important one. In accordance
with the conceptual framework discussed in Section 2.1, the explanatory variables that we use
reflect the characteristics of the entrepreneur, the firm, and the environment in which the firm
operates:
Characteristics of the entrepreneur:
Education level of the CEO
Characteristics of the Firm:
Number of years since the firm acquired its current legal status (age of the firm)
Percentage of the firm's capital owned by all private parties (ownership of the firm)
Number of employees (firm size)
Capital-labor ratio (relative factor intensity)
Sales per employee (labor productivity and ability to sell the products)
Percentage of the firm's capital leased to others
Environment of the Firm:
Share of firm’s output in manufacturing (sectoral location of the firm)
Share of firm’s output in trade (sectoral location of the firm).
The estimation of the parameters of the linear multinomial logit models is based on the
specification
                                                                              
5 The overwhelming majority of enterprise closures takes place in enterprises with less than 10
employees not just in transition countries but also in EU countries (Eurostat).
6 The corresponding OLS and probit regressions yield similar results.12
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where Prob[yi  = j] is the probability that the CEO cites a given constraint as being the most
important one, x is a vector of the explanatory variables defined above and β j  is a vector of
associated parameters.  While the estimation of the multinomial logit model is based on a
straightforward numerical optimisation (provided it is possible to identify the large number of
parameters), the interpretation of the estimated coefficients is somewhat more complex. In
contrast to the binomial models,  the signs of the cofficients on individual variables do not
necessarily correspond to the signs of their corresponding probability derivatives.
7 In particular,
letting pj  stand for Prob[Y = j] for all J, it is necessary to calculate the estimated asymptotic
probability derivatives  x p j ∂ ∂ /  and their asymptotic variance-covariance matrices V( x p j ∂ ∂ /) .
Given the large number of coefficients that we need to estimate in our system of logit equations,
we have carried out this calculation by expressing  the estimates of  x p j ∂ ∂ / a s
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7 For example, should the coefficient on age of firm in a linear model for the third constraint be positive,
this does not mean that the probability of the third constraint being selected as most important increases
with the firm’s age.13
where  [] [ ] ' x x / p p 2 ) l j ( 1 I p ) l j ( 1 p V j l l j jl ∂ ∂ − = + − = = , with 1(j = l) = 1 if j = l and 0
otherwise,  and I is a vector of 1s. The coefficients and standard errors reported in the tables of
this paper are hence the asymptotic probability derivatives and their asymptotic standard errors.
Another point worth noting is that some of the explanatory variables, such as the number
of employees, could be viewed as being endogenous. If one had additional data in the temporal or
cross sectional dimensions, it would be worthwhile to search for valid instrumental variables. In
the present study, this additional information is not available and we treat all the explanatory
variables as predetermined. As will be seen below, we have estimated some parsimonious
specifications that rely less on the potentially endogenous regressors. Finally, in some runs we
encountered problems of singularity of the likelihood function, which necessitated the exclusion
of some regressors.
4.2 Ranking the Highly Rated Constraints
In Table 2, we present the CEOs’ relative rankings of the ten most highly rated
constraints. The rows in Table 2 denote constraints, while the entries in the three columns show
the number of firms that ranked the given constraint as being (a) the most important one (No. 1),
(b) among the three most important constraints (No. 1-3), and (c) among the ten most important
constraints (No. 1-10), respectively.
8 The entries within each column give the five most often
cited constraints. Since the number of sampled SOEs in Bulgaria is significant (22), we provide
                    
8 For example, in the row denoted “Production – Suppliers are often not willing to deliver”, we observe
that in Russia 12 firms identified this constraint as being the most important one and 29 firms cited it as
being among the three most severe constraints.14
the Bulgarian results separately for private and state-owned firms. In Russia the number of
sampled SOEs is small and we therefore provide the results for all firms together.
As may be seen from Table 2, when one considers all firms in both countries, there is a
complete overlap across the countries in the five constraints that are most often cited by the
CEOs as being (a) the most important constraint (No. 1) or (b) among the three most important
constraints (No. 1-3). The most important constraint and the three most important constraints are
found most frequently in the areas of production and its expansion, financing, and infrastructure.
Within these areas, the specific most important constraints are: "Other production constraints",
"suppliers are often not ready to deliver", "financing problems that hinder expanding production",
"level of interest rates", and constraints on "getting land, office space and buildings". In both
countries, production problems are most frequently cited as the most important constraint but
financing problems are most widely cited among the three most important constraints.
When one considers the five constraints that are most often cited by the Russian and
Bulgarian firms as being among the ten most important constraints, the two countries maintain an
overlap on four constraints, and three of the original five constraints remain in the set. In
particular, the "level of interest rates", "financing problems that hinder expanding production"
and "getting land, office space and buildings" remain in the set, with the "level of interest rates"
being cited most often (by almost one-half of the Russian as well as Bulgarian firms). The new
constraint that is common to both countries is "frequent and unpredictable changes in prices of
local goods", which is unsurprising given the fact that both countries went through hyperinflation
in the early 1990s. This is also the second most frequently cited constraint in both countries.15
"Getting land, office space and buildings" becomes the third most cited constraint in both
countries, reflecting the fact that no restitution had taken place in Russia and that legislation
restricted the ability to sell restituted land and property in Bulgaria.
9 This is followed by "other
infrastructure constraints" in Bulgaria and "value added taxes" in Russia. Finally, "financing
problems that hinder expanding production" comes in fifth in terms of frequency of citations,
being cited by slightly more than one-quarter of all Russian and Bulgarian firms.
10
In view of the above rankings, in the rest of the paper we focus on the constraints in the
following four areas: carrying out production, expanding production, financing, and
infrastructure.
4.3 Carrying out Production
In the area of production, the CEOs were asked to rate eight potential constraints and to
identify the most important one among them.
11 The main constraints identified by the SMEs in
the area of production are "suppliers are often not ready to deliver" (identified as the most
important constraint by 33% Bulgarian and 11% percent Russian SMEs), "equipment is too old
and/or unreliable" (identified as the most important constraint by 25% of Russian and 8% of
Bulgarian managers), and "other". The first and third among these constraints also appear among
the most highly ranked constraints in the overall ranking exercise (Table 2).
                    
9 The inability to sell restituted property affects only private enterprises.
10 The Bulgarian SOE data show a significant overlap with the private firm rankings when one considers
the five constraints that are most often cited as being among the ten most important constraints.
11 The eight potential constraints included in this area are: (1) Suppliers are often not ready to deliver;
(2) Deliveries of raw materials are often delayed due to transport problems; (3) Cannot find spare parts;
(4) Difficult to repair production equipment due to lack of know-how; (5) Equipment is too old and/or
unreliable; (6) Lack of skilled manpower; (7) Power shortages; and (8) Other.16
Since the CEOs were rating and ranking eight potential constraints, we have estimated a
system of eight multinomial logit equations to determine which factors influence the probability
that the CEOs select any given constraint as the most important one. In accordance with our
conceptual framework, the explanatory variables are the ones listed in section 4.1 and they reflect
the characteristics of the entrepreneur, firm and firm’s environment.
The estimated derivatives from the logit dealing with the most important constraint,
namely "suppliers are often not ready to deliver," are given in Table 3. As may be seen from the
table, in Bulgaria one finds a strong relationship between all the explanatory variables and the
probability that the constraint "suppliers are often not ready to deliver" is cited as the most
important one.  The selection of this constraint is negatively related to the (university) education
of the manager, the capital intensity of the firm and the extent to which the firm is privately
owned. It is positively related to the firm's labor productivity, the percentage of its output in
manufacturing and trade, and its size as measured by the number of employees. The probability
has a U-shaped relationship with respect to the number of years since the firm acquired its
current legal status and the slope is declining within the relevant range for most firms. In Russia,
where only 23 firms identified this constraint as the most important one, the only significant
coefficients are found with respect to the percentage of output in manufacturing (negative) and
the number of employees, which is positive as in Bulgaria.
Hence, while larger firms in both countries appear to be more sensitive to delivery
bottlenecks than smaller firms, the similarity ends there. The constraint is for instance more
relevant to manufacturing firms in Bulgaria and non-manufacturing ones in Russia, reflecting in17
part the sectoral concentration of de novo firms in the two countries. As we discuss in the
Appendix, in Russia relatively more SMEs  emerged as a result of unbundling of large
manufacturing state-owned enterprises and the manufacturing sector enjoys pre-existing linkages
with suppliers and/or parent companies. This makes delivery bottlenecks a less important
obstacle for manufacturing SMEs than for those in the service sector which is almost completely
composed of de novo firms. In Bulgaria privatization and restructuring had not progressed at the
same pace as in Russia and most SMEs, regardless of sectors, are start-ups. Thus the
manufacturing sector in Bulgaria does not enjoy the relative advantage that we have observed in
Russia.  Finally, while the manager's human and the firm's physical capital as well as the age
(experience) and private ownership diminish the importance of the delivery constraint in
Bulgaria, no systematic relationship with these variables is found in Russia, even in more
parsimonious specifications. These differences suggest that the nature of disruption of deliveries
after the fall of central planning, discussed by Blanchard and Kremer (1997) and Roland and
Verdier (1999), was more ubiquitous and all-encompassing in Russia than in Bulgaria.
As might be expected, the estimated coefficients and calculated derivatives for the seven
other constraints listed in the area of production were uniformly insignificant and only the
frequently invoked "other" constraint model occasionally produced coefficients whose
significance approached the traditional significance test levels.18
4.4 Expanding Production
In this area, the managers were asked to rate and identify the most important of eleven
potential constraints to expanding production.
12 In interpreting the answers in this area, it is
useful to keep in mind that the average Russian and Bulgarian SME reports to be operating at
57% and 69% of production capacity, respectively. In this context, the SME managers identified
"financing problems” as constituting the most important constraint. Full 40% (62%) of Russian
and 29% (38%) of Bulgarian managers ranked financing problems as most important (very
important). The financing problems also figure prominently in the overall relative ranking of all
the most highly rated constraints (Table 2).
Interestingly, when we ran the multinomial logits to assess if there are systematic
determinants of the probability that “financing problems” is selected as the most important
constraint, we did not obtain significant coefficients in any specification. Hence, the financing
problems constraint is important both absolutely and in relative terms, and its effect is uniform in
that the probability of its selection is not systematically linked to observable characteristics of the
entrepreneur, the firm, or the sector in which the firm operates.
13
4.5  Financing
                    
12 The potential obstacles listed in the question are: (1) Competition is high; (2) Not enough qualified
labour; (3) Insufficient demand for output; (4) Cannot ship production, bad transportation; (5) I am not
interested in expansion; (6) Administrative problems; (7) Input procurement problems; (8) Financing
problems; (9) Taxes; (10) Bad access to foreign markets; and (11) Other (specify).19
The SMEs report receiving virtually no open or hidden subsidies from the state. The
debt/equity ratio of the average SME was 48% in Bulgaria and 30% in Russia, but the mean
values have sizable standard deviations. As is the case for SMEs elsewhere in the world, own or
family capital played a very important part in the start-up of most of our SMEs. However, bank
capital was somewhat important in Bulgaria, and obtaining capital from a spin-off or partners
was somewhat important in Russia. This result is in line with the credit rationing literature that is
based on the argument of incomplete or asymmetric information (e.g., Jaffee and Stiglitz,1990),
according to which younger firms suffer relatively more than older firms from credit rationing.
The different pattern in the two countries is also probably brought about by the lack of financial
discipline in the Bulgarian financial sector that culminated in the 1996 banking crisis, and by the
privatisation pattern in Russia that generated an SME sector that contained relatively more spin-
offs. In both countries, the CEOs attribute the willingness of others to lend them at the start of
their venture to their personal reputation (cited as most important by 51% of the CEOs in Russia
and 20% in Bulgaria),
14 the reputation of their product (20% and 13%, respectively), and the
quality of their business plan (14% in both countries).
The SMEs in our sample use the banking system in that virtually all (96% in Bulgaria and
99% in Russia) have a bank account. However, unlike Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (1999),
we find that the firms’ integration into the formal credit system remains limited in both countries.
In particular, while most firms in the Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (1999) sample report
receiving a loan, only 37% of the Bulgarian and 29% of the Russian firms in our sample report
                                                                              
13 The estimated coefficients of the logits that we ran for the ten other constraints in the area of
expanding production were also statistically insignificant.20
obtaining a loan from a financial institution in the past three years.
15 Moreover, only 56 (25%) of
our Bulgarian and 16 (7%) of our Russian firms know about special financing programs for
SMEs and only 8 Bulgarian and 7 Russian firms benefited from them.
In this context it is interesting to note that our Russian SMEs on average reinvest 58% of
their profit, while our average Bulgarian SME reinvests 74% of its profit. These averages are
higher than the 30-50% range reported by Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (1999). Moreover,
while the average firm in all countries of the Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff sample reports
non-reinvested profits that exceed its bank loans, in our sample this is the case for Russia but not
for Bulgaria. Since in the Russian sample there are more SMEs that are spin-offs resulting from
internal buy-outs, it is possible that managers of these firms are not as interested in investing and
restructuring as are the owners of the Bulgarian (mostly private start-up) SMEs. This hypothesis
that owners of start-up firms have a higher propensity to invest from retained earnings than
managers of spin-offs should be explored in future research.
In the area of financing, we asked the managers to rate and identify the most important of
eight potential constraints
16. The "level of interest rates" was identified by the largest number of
                                                                              
14In Bulgaria, 46% of managers did nor rank the most important reason in this question. The 20% of firms
thus correspond to almost 40% of responding firms.
15 The difference between Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff’s and our results may be explained in part
by the fact that their sample covers some of the most developed and wealthy areas of the countries that
they investigated (e.g. Katowice in Poland), in part by the high average initial employment of start-ups in
their sample (34.4 employees in Poland and 31.9 employees in Ukraine), and in part by their high upper
employment limit for private small and medium-sized enterprises (270 vs. 200 employees). The 270
employee limit exceeds even the 250 limit used by the European Union in its official classification.
Finally, the Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff surveys were run two-three years after those described in
this paper and inevitably reflect a more advanced stage of transition than the one reflected in our survey.
16 The constraints listed are: Collateral requirements; Requirements to produce financial documents;
Level of interest rates; Deposit/loan track record requirement; Not having connections in banks or in21
managers as both a "very important" and the "most important" constraint. Indeed, 83% of the
Russian and 78% of the Bulgarian managers have rated this constraint as being "very important",
and 67% in each country selected it as the "most important" problem. The level of interest rate is
also one of the most highly ranked constraints in the overall ranking of all the highly rated
constraints in the questionnaire (Table 2).
When we ran multinomial logits to assess if there were systematic determinants of the
probability that the high level of interest rates was selected as the most important constraint, we
had to drop several regressors in the Russian equation in order to avoid singularity of the
likelihood function and achieve identification. As may be seen from Table 4, in both countries
the capital intensity of production has a positive effect on the probability that the level of interest
rates is selected as the most important constraint, although in Bulgaria the estimated coefficient
is not very significant. The positive coefficient on capital intensity is intuitively plausible as
capital-intensive operations have a greater need for investment and suffer more from high interest
rates. Unlike in Bulgaria, in Russia we find no other variables affecting significantly the
probability that the level of interest rates is selected as the most important constraint by the
CEOs. Hence as with the constraint on delivery in production, the interest rate constraint is found
to be generally rather than selectively binding in Russia. In contrast, in Bulgaria the probability of
selecting interest rates as the most important constraint is also negatively related to the
(university) education of the CEO, labor productivity, and in the relevant range also to the age of
the firm. It is positively related to the manufacturing orientation of the firm's production, the
                                                                              
financial institutions; Access to non-bank investors/partners; Permits and licenses from institutions other
than banks; Other (specify).22
extent to which the firm is privately owned, and its size as measured by employment. These
findings indicate that Bulgarian firms that have existed longer and have a more educated manager
tend to feel less acutely the interest rate constraint, being probably better able to find a way
around this constraint. In contrast, firms that are larger, more capital intensive, operate more in
manufacturing (perhaps being perceived by banks as a riskier sector than services) and are more
privately (less state-) owned, tend to rank the (high) level of interest rates as being the most
important constraint to obtaining financing. These firms need more capital and may have harder
time obtaining it from the traditional sources.
17
4.6 Infrastructure
In the area of infrastructure, the CEOs were asked to rate 11 potential constraints and, as
usual, to identify the most important one among them.
18 The answers indicate that "getting land,
                                                                              
17 The SMEs not only seek credit but they also serve as creditors. In Russia, about 50% of the sampled
SMEs were asked for credit by their customers in the last two years and about one-third of the firms
provided such credit. The corresponding numbers in Bulgaria are 44-47% and 39-43%, respectively.
Hence about one-third of the Russian and two-fifths of the Bulgarian firms serve as creditors to their
customers. This finding is important because it contradicts some of the anecdotal evidence that
asymmetric information and high default risk tend to generate a cash-in-advance economy in the
transition.
In both countries, virtually all (90%) firms that provide customer credit personally check the
creditworthiness of the buyers, rather than using a credit agency or another mechanism. In both countries
they on average finance about one-third of the value of the sales. The average time length of the credit is
two months in Russia and 4 months in Bulgaria. The average share of late payments in the total credit has
over the last two years been 19-25% in Russia and 26-27% in Bulgaria. Defaults have on average
accounted for 7-8% of total credit in Russia and 3-4% in Bulgaria. SOEs are on average viewed by SME
managers to be about 30% more likely to default than private firms in Russia and more than twice as
much likely in Bulgaria. In both countries, the SMEs negotiate with clients that do not pay and some
SMEs tend to resort to court or private agency specializing in collection of debts. Very few firms (10 in
Russia and 13 in Bulgaria) report writing off debts.
18 The potential obstacles listed are: (1) Getting land, office space, buildings; (2) Power breakdowns; (3)
Voltage fluctuations; (4) Telecommunications problems; (5) Water supply; (6) Waste water disposal; (7)
Garbage disposal; (8) Quality of roads; (9) Quality of railway transport; (10) Quality of ports; and (11)
Other (specify).23
office space and buildings" is the main problem. 52% of the Russian and 55% of the Bulgarian
managers rated this problem as "very important", while 51% and 59%, respectively, ranked it as
the "most important" problem in this area. The problem is also identified as one of the most
important constraints in the overall ranking across areas of all the highly rated constraints (Table
2).
19 The ranking is consistent with the fact that leasing land and office space is the dominant
mode of operation, with the ratio of SMEs that lease their land and office space to those who
own it being 1.7 in Russia and 2.3 in Bulgaria.  The finding is intuitively acceptable, given the
problems linked to restitution and lack of development of land registries in both countries. The
average SME also expressed a strong desire to expand its existing buildings and machinery (by
90% in Russia and 73% in Bulgaria), and over two-thirds of the respondents in each country
expect to face serious problems in this area.
Table 5 contains the multinomial logit derivatives of the effects of explanatory variables
on the probability that "getting land, office space and buildings" is selected as the most important
constraint. As may be seen from the table, most of the coefficients are significant for Russia and
all are significant for Bulgaria. (As in other estimations, some variables had to be omitted from
the system to avoid singularity of likelihood and ensure identification of parameters.) In both
countries the probability is negatively related to the age and size of the firm, but positively
related to labor productivity. The age effect probably indicates that firms that have been longer in
existence either inherited or found ways to secure relatively adequate premises. The size effect
may have a similar interpretation, while high productivity could be the result of past growth that
                    
19 Power breakdowns was identified as the most important problem by 18% of managers in Russia, while
telecommunications problems and road quality were each selected by 9% of the managers in Bulgaria.24
moved the firm against the infrastructure constraint. The two countries differ in the effect of
CEO’s education (positive in Bulgaria and negative in Russia), capital intensity (negative in
Bulgaria and insignificant in Russia), percentage of output in manufacturing (positive in Russia
but negative in Bulgaria), and the extent of private ownership (insignificant in Russia and
positive in Bulgaria). The workings of the emerging real estate market hence appear to be
somewhat different in the two countries.
4.7 Other Issues
Since specific constraints in the areas of carrying out production and expanding
production were identified as most important in Table 2, we have also examined  the constraints
in the area of sales. The average Russian SME in our sample sells 96% of its products on the
domestic market and reports having done so in the preceding year as well as in the first year of its
operations. The average Bulgarian firm is a bit more export-oriented, selling 88% of its products
domestically. 34% of the Bulgarian and 16% of the Russian firms changed the markets for which
they produced during the last five years. The most highly rated and ranked factor behind this
switch was a decline in demand from state institutions, followed by increased opportunities to
export to other countries (for Bulgaria) and decreased demand elsewhere in Russia (for the
Russian SMEs).
What are the principal obstacles to increasing local sales? To answer this question, we
asked the CEOs to rate a list of nine potential constraints and identify the most important one
among them
20. The "lack of credit finance" comes on top, being cited as the most important
                    
20 The list of potential constraints included: (1) Lack of credit finance; (2) Lack of demand for my
products; (3) Competition from local companies; (4) Competition from foreign companies; (5) Technical25
obstacle by 33% of the Russian and 26% of the Bulgarian firms. High cost of raw materials is
cited by 17% of the Russian and 25% of the Bulgarian firms. The principal other constraints
(lack of demand, competition from domestic companies, and technological problems) are
selected as most important by fewer than 15% of companies in either country.
In the early phases of the transition, the success of SMEs may depend crucially on their
ability to do business with the state sector of the economy. We therefore asked the managers to
rate the main obstacles to doing business with the SOEs and other government institutions and to
identify the most important constraint. About 30% of the managers in both countries identified as
the most important constraint the fact that "SOEs/government pay late or less than the agreed
amounts". 25% of managers in both countries ranked as the most important constraint the fact
that "contracts are only available to those with connections". These two constraints were also
rated more frequently than others as being very important constraints in this area. The results
suggest that the SOEs and government institutions discriminate or project the image that they
discriminate against SMEs in allocating contracts, and also that delinquency in payments makes
it difficult for SMEs to do business with the state sector. The findings are surprisingly uniform
across the two countries and appear to be consistent with the more casual evidence from other
transition economies.
                                                                              
or technological problems; (6) Difficulties with supplies; (7) High cost of raw materials; (8) Lack of
skilled labour; and (9) Other (specify).26
In identifying obstacles to increasing exports, we asked the CEOs to rate a list of
constraints and to identify the most important one among them
21. The lack of finance was again
cited as the most important constraint to starting or increasing exports. Indeed 41% of the
Russian and 18% of Bulgarian firms identified this as the most important constraint, with the
Bulgarian percentage constituting over 30% of responses since 40% of the Bulgarian SMEs did
not identify the most important constraint in this area.
The multinomial logits that we ran show that few significant relationships exist with our
explanatory variables in Bulgaria, but very definite patterns may be established for the lack of
finance in Russia. In the Bulgarian data, one finds that firms with higher sales per employee are
less likely to cite "a lack of finance" and more privately owned firms are less likely to identify
"competition in new markets" as the most important constraint. In Russia the lack of finance is
positively and significantly related to all the explanatory variables except for the size of the firm,
where the relationship is negative and significant.
The two areas that SME managers did not identify as having severe constraints are
government regulation and business services. In this context, it is interesting to note that the
firms do not report being constrained by the difficulty of obtaining licenses or facing security
issues.
22 However, since licensing affects disproportionately nascent businesses, our finding of a
                    
21 The list of potential constraints includes: Lack of finance; Lack of knowledge of new markets; Lack of
new technology; Competition in new markets; Administrative costs (tariffs, licenses) necessary for
export; Lack of skilled labour; Other (specify).
22 The average firm in our sample needed 2 licenses in Russia and 3 in Bulgaria to start
operations. It spent 208 hours in Russia and 164 hours in Bulgaria and waited 6.7 and 5 weeks,
respectively, to obtain these licenses. 10% of the Russian and 25% of the Bulgarian firms hired
external agents to help them obtain start-up licenses. Two-thirds of the Bulgarian but only 44%
of the Russian firms employ a security company or individuals for protecting their premises.27
lack of major constraint in this area probably underestimates the seriousness of the issue. In
particular, our sample excludes those entrepreneurs who did not succeed in starting business due
to the complexity and burden of government regulation. This may be a serious issue that we are
unable to register in our data.
5. Conclusions
Our study of stratified random samples of 216 Russian and 221 Bulgarian small and
medium size enterprises (SMEs) shows a remarkable similarity of views of their owners/top
managers (CEOs) with respect to objectives and constraints that they face. This finding suggests
that the nature of issues confronting SMEs and the policies that may be formulated to assist them
are similar across the transition economies. The CEO responses and data from their firms yield
the following specific conclusions:
A.  The SMEs in the two economies are primarily recently created and privately owned firms that
are characterized by highly concentrated ownership. The two most important objectives of
their CEOs are achieving the highest possible profit and output growth. While for new and
small firms these two objectives may represent the same goal, the emphasis on output growth
may also signal the presence of obstacles to growth. In the future, researchers ought to
examine in depth these two competing explanations. Resolving this issue is important from
both the academic and policy standpoint.
B.  Most CEOs in both countries perceive to be hampered by a relatively small number of
specific constraints. The five constraints that they cite most frequently as being most
                                                                              
There is thus a much greater reliance by the Russian SMEs on in-house protection than is the case in
Bulgaria.28
important in both countries are: (i) "suppliers are often not ready to deliver", (ii) the firm is
facing "financing problems that hinder expanding production", (iii) the firm is facing high
"level of interest rates", (iv) the firm is facing constraints on "getting land, office space and
buildings", and (v) "other production constraints".
C.  Constraints on obtaining external financing and the high cost of this financing are hence two
of the top five constraints cited by most CEOs. The lack of credit finance was also cited by
the CEOs as being the most important obstacle to increasing local sales, and it also appeared
as the most important constraint with respect to increasing exports. Moreover, the constraint
appears to be binding across the board, since the probability of it being selected as the most
important constraint to expanding production is unrelated to manager-, firm- or sector-
specific variables. Finally, only about a third of the surveyed firms report receiving a loan
from a financial institution over the past three years and an even smaller fraction have heard
about special financing programs for SMEs. Our principal finding is hence that the external
financing constraint is a serious one. We also find that firms reinvest profits while operating
under the external financing constraint. We hence conclude that financial constraints hamper
SME growth and that the use of internal finance by SMEs represents a fall-back option. In
this sense our study provides evidence that is contrary to the findings of Johnson, McMillan
and Woodruff (1999). Our evidence is consistent, however, with the findings of Rajan and
Zingales (1998), Winker (1999) and Lizal and Svejnar (2000).
D.  Our econometric analysis of the determinants of the most important constraints indicate that
all three sets of factors (characteristics of the entrepreneur, of the firm and of the firm’s
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environment) are important. However, their effect is not always uniform across countries and
constraints. For example, more educated entrepreneurs are better able to ensure that suppliers
deliver and in Bulgaria they are also better able to get around the problem of high interest
rates. Firm-specific factors are found to be important in that larger size firms for instance
suffer more from unreliable supplier deliveries, capital intensive firms complain more about
the problem of high interest rates and more established (older) and larger firms are better able
to cope with problems of getting land, office space and buildings. Environmental factors,
which we capture by the sectoral location of the firm, are important but their effect often
differs in the two economies. In Bulgaria, firms in manufacturing suffer more than other
firms from supplier delivery problems, while the situation is reverse in Russia. Yet, in Russia
manufacturing firms suffer more than others from the problem of getting land, office space
and buildings, while the situation is just the opposite in Bulgaria. Finally, we find that the
most important constraints in the areas of production and finance are all-encompassing in
Russia in that they affect SMEs irrespective of the characteristics of the CEO, the firm, or the
sector of activity. In contrast, in Bulgaria the severity of the most important constraints in
these two areas varies systematically with the CEO, firm and sectoral characteristics. These
differences suggest that the nature of disruption of production and of the financial constraints
after the fall of central planning was more ubiquitous and all-encompassing in Russia than in
Bulgaria. Hence, our empirical evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the
disorganization phenomenon modelled for instance by Blanchard and Kremer (1997) and30
Roland and Verdier (1999) was more prevalent in the former Soviet Union than in the
satellite countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
E.  Finally, while SMEs would clearly benefit in their development if they had fair access to
doing business with the state sector, our findings indicate that the state firms and other
government institutions discriminate or project the image that they discriminate against
SMEs in allocating contracts. Moreover, the state’s delinquency in making payments for
goods delivered and services rendered makes it difficult for the financially strapped SMEs to
do business with the state sector.31
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Appendix
Basic Statistics
The two samples are of similar size, comprising 216 companies in Russia and 221 in
Bulgaria
23.  As may be seen from Table A1, they contain primarily private companies. In both
Bulgaria and Russia, most private SMEs are individual or family owned, followed by local
private ownership. Unsurprisingly, given the tendency of FDI to concentrate in larger firms, very
few of the sampled SMEs have foreign owners. Moreover, in virtually all firms the principal
owner has a majority ownership, with the average ownership being in excess of 90% and having
low standard deviation in most ownership categories.
Table A2 shows the relationship between the current and former ownership status of the
firm. As may be seen from the table, an overwhelming majority of the sampled companies (73%
in Russia and 82% in Bulgaria) started as a new company. The concentration of start-ups is even
higher if the sample is restricted to private sector only (79% of Russian SMEs and 92% of the
Bulgarian SMEs).
24 The fact that relatively more Bulgarian companies are new start-ups of
course reflects the different privatisation pattern the two countries. Whereas in the case of small-
scale privatisation both countries had progressed more or less at the same pace, at the time
Russia had advanced well with large-scale privatisation and unbundling of large state owned
companies relatively to Bulgaria, thus generating a greater proportion of spin-offs in its SME
sector. Bulgaria instead experienced significant resistance to large-scale privatisation from both
                    
23 The response rate was high and most of our findings are based on responses from all or virtually all of
the firms.
24As can be seen from Table A2, these percentages actually underestimate the numbers of private companies
that started private. This is because some companies report to have always been private. When these "old"34
ministry officials and management of state enterprises and virtually no restructuring. Thus the
impetus to private sector development in that country found its outlet in the creation of new
companies.  This is reflected in the sample, with full 18% of the Russian companies but only 4%
of the Bulgarian SMEs report to have existed as part of a state-owned enterprise before.
25
Since most of the surveyed SMEs started as a new company, it is not surprising to find
that the companies are fairly young. The average Bulgarian SME started its operations in 1989
and obtained its current legal status in 1991. The average Russian SME started operating in 1986
and its current legal status dates to 1992. An examination of the data indicates that the number of
years since obtaining the current legal form is more indicative of the experience of the firm and
its current management than the founding date because some firms report the founding dates of
companies from which they were spun off.
Virtually all the SMEs (96% in Russia and 98% in Bulgaria) are independent companies
rather than subsidiaries. In terms of corporate structure, one can see from Table A3 that most
Russian and Bulgarian SMEs are registered as limited liability companies or partnerships. In
Bulgaria, over one-third are registered as unlimited liability companies, indicating lesser concern
of the Russian SMEs about limiting their liability exposure. In Russia a bankruptcy law became
effective in March 1993 and, despite its limited implementation, it had started to influence
enterprise behaviour (EBRD, 1995). In Bulgaria the 1994 bankruptcy law started being
                                                                              
private companies are added to the "newly formed" private companies, the percentage of private firms that
started as private is 95% in Bulgaria and 81% in Russia.
25 This difference is not brought about by relatively more Russian non-private firms reporting that they
were part of an SOE in the past. Rather, 14% of the Russian private firms but only 3% of the Bulgarian
private firms report to have been part of an SOE.35
implemented only in the second half of 1996 (EBRD, 1996), well after the administration of this
survey.
The summary statistics of the main variables, reported in Table A4, indicate that the
average private SME is roughly of a similar size in the two countries, having 27 employees in
Bulgaria and 33 in Russia. The average private Bulgarian SME has a higher labor cost to sales
ratio and a correspondingly lower profit to sales ratio than its Russian counterpart. The average
figures for the state firms (especially in Russia) are not particularly useful because of a
significant skewness in the distribution of the various values. Nevertheless, it is useful to note
that in both countries the average SOE is much larger (in terms of employment) than the
corresponding average private firm. While one might a priori expect the SMEs to engage in
labor intensive operations, in both samples the average ratio of labor cost to total cost is just
under 20%. With the average reported profit amounting to somewhat more than the labor cost in
Russia and slightly less than the labor cost in Bulgaria, there is evidence that non-labor inputs are
a crucial component of costs for these firms.Table 1: Importance Placed by the CEO on Various Objectives

























N%N% N % N % N%N % N % N %
Achieve Highest
 Possible Output
154 71 82 38 136 72 73 39 158 72 114 52 138 73 101 54
Achieve Highest
 Possible Profit
153 71 106 49 134 71 93 49 96 44 56 26 84 45 50 27
Achieve Highest
Possible Wages
87 40 13 6 72 38 10 5 57 26 11 5 48 26 10 5
Achieve Highest
Possible Employment
47 22 3 1 42 22 3 2 21 10 3 1 19 10 2 1
Achieve Highest
Possible Non-wage Benefits
33 15 2 1 26 14 2 1 30 14 1 .5 20 11 1 .5
Prepare Privatization
(If SOE)
9400 -- - - 525 2 ----
Prevent Social Conflict 59 27 4 2 51 27 4 2 16 7 3 1 13 7 2 1
Other Objective 15 7 4 2 13 7 3 2 36 16 20 10 27 14 17 9
Not Answered 0 2 1 0 1 0 5 2 0 5 3
Total 557 216 100 474 189 100 419 219 100 349 188 100
Note:  
1 Gives the numbers and percentage of firms that considered (rated) a given objective as very important, where very important equals 5 on a scale
from 1 (unimportant) to 5.  More than one objective could be rated very important. 
2  Gives the number and percentage of firms that ranked a given objective as the most important from all the objectives.Table 2: Relative Ranking of Most Highly Rated Constraints -
Number of Firms Ranking a Given Constraint as No. 1, No. 1-3 and No. 1-10







No. 1 No. 1-3 No. 1-10 No. 1 No. 1-3 No. 1-10 No. 1 No. 1-3 No. 1-10
Constraints:
Production
- Suppliers are often not ready to deliver


















- Bad access to foreign markets





- Level of Interest Rates 18 38 101 16 34 89 7
Infrastructure
- Getting land, office space, buildings
- Other
11 25 79 11 24 75
58
Local Purchases
- Prices of local goods change in a frequent and
unpredictable manner
80 69 3 8
Taxes





- Trade Unions 2
Imports
- Prices of imported goods are too high 16Table 3: Determinants of the Probability that the Most Important Constraint in the
Area of Production is “Suppliers Are Not Ready to Deliver,”
(Multinomial Logit Estimates of Probability Derivatives;











































P Value .000 .048
Notes: P value for the Wald test that all parameters are jointly zero.
* = Significantly different from zero at 10% test level.
** = Significantly different from zero at 5% test level.Table 4: Determinants of the Probability that the Most Important Constraint
in the Area of Financing is the “Level of Interest Rates”
(Multinomial Logit Estimates of Probability Derivatives; Values





























% Private Ownership .001**
(.0001)
No. of Employees .003**
(.0003)
P Value .000 0.000
Notes: P value for the Wald test that all parameters are jointly zero.
* = Significantly different from zero at 10% test level.
** = Significantly different from zero at 5% test level or better.Table 5: Determinants of the Probability that the Most Important Problem in the Area of
Infrastructure is “Getting Land, Office Space and Buildings”
(Multinomial Logit Estimates of Probability Derivatives; Values in
































% Q in Trade .0034**
(.0015)








P Value 0.000 0.000
Notes: P value for the Wald test that all parameters are jointly zero.
* = Significantly different from zero at 10% test level.
** = Significantly different from zero at 5% test level or better.Table A1: Ownership of SMEs
Russia Bulgaria
Number % Number %
Private 189 87.5 190 86
State Owned 7 3.2 22 10
Mixed Form
(Joint Venture)
16 7.4 7 3.1
O t h e r 4 1 . 920 . 9
Total 216 100 221 100Table A2: Evolution of Ownership of SMEs
Russia Bulgaria
All Firms Now Private Now State All Firms Now Private Now State
N% N % N N % N % N %
Formed as a new Co. 158 73 150 79.4 2 181 81.9 175 92.1 - -
Was Part of a SOE 39 18 27 14.3 2 8 4.0 6 3.1 2 9.1
Was Part of a Private Co. 5 2.3 4 2.1 - 3 1.4 3 1.6 - -
Was Part of a Coop 5 2.3 3 1.6 - - - - - - -
Has always been a SOE 4 1.9 - - 2 22 10 - - 20 90.9
Has always been a Private Co. 3 1.4 3 1.6 - 6 2.7 6 3.2 - -
Other 2 0.9 2 1.1 - - - - - - -
Total 216 100 189 100 6 221 100 190 100 22 100.
Notes: Percentages in columns will not add up due to rounding off.Table A3: Corporate Structure of SMEs
Russia Bulgaria
N% N %
Ltd. Liability 34 15.7 86 38.9
Unlimited Liability - - 81 36.7
Ltd. Partnership 113 52.3 1 0.5
General Partnership - - 40 18.1
Joint Stock 27 12.5 8 3.6
State Enterprise 3 1.4 4 1.8
Producer Cooperative 4 1.9 - -
Municipal Enterprise 3 1.4 - -
Other 32 14.8 1 0.5
Total 216 100 221 100Table A4: Mean Values of Statistics Relating to Enterprise Structure and Performance









Sales 760.7 628.6 14,872 14,872
Total Cost 565.2 239.0 10,312 22,929
Labor Cost 92.2 62.7 2,961 4,074
Pretax Profit 114.3 35.4 1,204 2,343
Fixed Assets 300.1 599.6 4,292 23,675
Total Employment 33.0 52.6 27.3 74.5
Full-time Employment 29.7 51.7 23.7 72.7
Part-time Employment 1.4 .9 .74 .1
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